Chicago Child Support Lawyer

 A trial court judge in the domestic relations division possesses the jurisdiction to hear all issues which are justiciable in nature and are related to the dissolution of marriage proceeding; thus a judge may declare a transfer void when it is demonstrated that the conveyance was colorable or illusory.  In re Shehad

 Under former Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 40, paras, 18 and 19 (see now this section and 750 ILCS 5/504), where the wife was the sole beneficial owner of a farm and the husband did not know of the original mortgage thereon until after its execution, and it was only when the encumbrance was increased that he signed the mortgage, the wife was not entitled to contribution toward to payment of the mortgage debt and the divorce decree properly relieved the husband of any obligation to pay such debt. Olson v. Olson

 Where the trial court refused to set aside the father’s non-marital funds, pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/503(g), for the payment of child support during the father’s incarceration, the trial court’s decision did not have support under 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1), as §505(a)(1) did not limit what assets the trial court could reach to assure that a child support award was satisfied.  Hari v. Hari
 Construction that trial court gave subsection (d) of this section as authorizing an outright conveyance of marital property in trust for a minor son, unrelated to his support or maintenance, was clearly in error.  Raski v. Raski
 The court erred in requiring defendant to convey his one-half interest to plaintiff since she did not demonstrate special equities in the residence under former section 18 of the Divorce Act (see now this section).  Hogan v. Hogan
 Under former Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 40, para. 18 (see now this section,) where there were no allegations of special circumstances or allegations asking for relief with reference to a particular property which was owned in joint tenancy by a wife and husband, and there was no evidence as to any other value of the real estate except for a $3,000 mortgage, nor was there evidence as to the value of the real estate at the time the decree was entered, that portion of a divorce decree which compelled the wife to convey her interest in the property upon the husband paying to her the sum of $3,000 was erroneous.  Marcy v. Marcy
 Where appellee did not file a brief and there was nothing in the record alleging any fact with respect to the real estate in question, or any ground whatsoever upon which appellee would be equitably entitle to have a conveyance made from appellant to him, the judgment of the court ordering the appellant to convey to appellee the real estate described in the decree pursuant to former section 17 of the Divorce Act (see now this section) was reversed.  Skoronski v. Skoronski
 Where no special equities were present, it was error for the court to order a transfer of the one half interest of the husband’s real and personal property to the wife, and error for the court to refuse to cause to be reconveyed to the husband the interest conveyed to the wife immediately before the marriage, and in not requiring the return of the automobile turned over to her as an inducement to resume marital relations.  Bissett v. Bissett

Fee Contracts
 Even though expected contingent fees may not be considered a marital asset because of their speculative value, husband’s expenses on behalf of contingent cases were comparable to an investment, and since husband received the value of the investment and its yield in the form of future income, wife had to receive the present value of the investment, which was an amount equal to the expenses attributable to the contingent cases prior to dissolution.  In re Zells
 Given the intangibility of a contingent fee, its unascertainable and speculative value, the aleatory nature of the right to receive it, and the uncertainly of collection, a contingent fee cannot be considered an asset of either the marital estate or of the law practice from which it is derived.  In re Zells.
 A lawyer’s contingent fee contracts are not subject to valuation, division and distribution as part of the marital estate, as such a division would comprise an impermissible ethical conflict.  In re Zells

 Under 750 ILCS 5/503(j), a contribution award may take the form of either a set dollar amount or a percentage of fees and costs and does not require allocation of attorney fees based on a percentage of fees ultimately paid rather than billed.  Suriano v. Lafebar
 Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the husband to pay only half of the wife’s attorney fees.  In re stufflebeam
 Respondent’s memorandum to the trial court only amounted to a general objection to an award of attorney fees and did not request a hearing on the fees; therefore, respondent waived his right for a hearing on the court’s order to pay a portion of petitioner’s attorney fees.  In re Blazis

 While this Act does not mandate equal distribution of marital assets between spouses, the property must be divided in just proportion, taking into account listed factors.  In re Rapacz
 Non-marital property may be presumptively transmuted to marital property.  In re Rink
 This section permits the court to allocate marital property, regardless of who holds title, to each spouse in just proportion after considering all relevant factors including inter alia, the contributions of each spouse, their relative economic circumstances, their age, health, occupation, and other available income and whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance.  In re Lukas
 This Act does not purport to affect property interests during the marriage, but merely classifies the aggregate property interests of the spouses for the purposes of equitably distributing the property upon termination of the marriage.  In re Nicks
 Under section 17 of the former Divorce Act (see now this section) courts in divorce actions could adjudicate property rights between parties regardless of fault or the grounds for divorce upon the basis of special circumstances, equitable ownership and other equities; particularly was this general rule to be followed where the property involved was acquired as the result of joint efforts by the parties to the marital contract.  Furthermore, the circumstances and equities relied upon were required to be both alleged in the pleadings and supported by the evidence.  Schouten v. Schouten

 It was not an abuse of discretion to not require the husband to contribute to the wife’s attorney fees as the wife failed to show an inability to pay her own attorney fees.  Schneider v. Schneider
 750 ILCS 5/503(j) does not require an additional hearing, but, rather, requires a trial court to hear, through testimony or otherwise, additional proofs when a petition for contribution is filed in accordance with §503(j) in the context of pre-existing proceedings.  Suriano v. Lafeber
 A party requesting attorney fees must do more than merely ask for attorney fees; the party requesting attorney fees must present the trial court with a detailed record containing the computations for fees, who performed the services for which fees are sought, the time spent representing the client, and the hourly rate charged.  In re Konchar

College Expenses
 A custodial parent could not waive child’s claim to college expenses in a property settlement agreement with non-custodial parent; parents cannot bargain away the child’s right under the agreement without benefit to the child, without judicial approval, and without means available to the child to judicially contest the parents’ agreement in violation of the Illinois law.  Miller v. Miller
Standing
 Evidence held sufficient that child of divorced parents had standing in the trial court divorce proceedings to enforce the terms of the divorce decree which obligated the non-custodial parent to pay his college expenses.  Miller v. Miller
Evidence Held Sufficient
 Where, despite the court’s expressed uncertainties, the court ultimately decided in favor of the maternal grandparents over uncle in custody dispute, there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s decision.  In re Russell
Factors Considered
 The trial court correctly considered the relevant factors in deciding whether the amount of attorney fees was reasonable where at the hearing on fees for petitioner’s attorneys, the expertise of the attorneys was testified to; each attorney testified as to the hourly rate he charged and that each had in fact rendered the services specified; the motion judge stated that he was acquainted with the case and that the parties were “litigious people” requiring their attorney’s frequent presence in court; respondent’s gross income for two years was established; and petitioner was found not to be employed but was dependent upon the moneys which respondent was ordered to pay as temporary maintenance.  In re Zannis

Prejudicial Effect
 A court may consider the period of time that a child has spent with a parent by virtue of a temporary custody order but there is no presumption in favor of the existing custodian under this section as there is in modification cases under 750 ILCS 5/610.  In re Hefer
Not Inflexible
 There is today no inflexible rule which requires that custody of children, especially of tender age, be vested in the mother. Marcus v. Marcus
 While it is usual to place small children in the care of their mother, this is not an inflexible rule, since the welfare of the child is the prime consideration.  Wachowski v. Wachowski
 For a case which states the tender years doctrine is not inflexible, see Wolfrum v. Wolfrum
Presumption
 For a case decided under the presumption of the tender years doctrine, see King v. Vancil

 Where the evidence before the trial court did not clearly favor either party, the reviewing court could not say that the trial court’s decision to place permanent custody of the child with one of the parents was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Prince v. Herrera
  Where, in prior order, the court clearly stated its position that custody of the minor child was yet to be determined, it was futile to argue that that order should be deemed a custody determination favor of the mother; accordingly an order granting permanent custody of minor to his father was the initial custody determination, and did not involve the standards and requirements for modification, as contended by mother; being an initial determination of custody, the trial court correctly relied on the “best interest” standard as provided by law.  In re Koca
 A trial court’s custody decision will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion or the decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  In re Willis
 In cases regarding custody, there is a strong and compelling presumption in favor of the result reached by the trial court.  In re Willis
 A reviewing court will not overturn a determination of custody unless the trial court’s decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or exhibits a clear abuse of discretion since the trial court, having had a superior opportunity to observe the witnesses, evaluate the evidence and consider the needs of the child, is in a better position than a reviewing court to determine just what that best interest is.  In re Quindry
 A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s determination of credibility because the trial court has a superior vantage point, which cannot be reproduced from the old record, to observe and judge the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility; the trial court is therefore in a better position to evaluate the credibility, temperaments, personalities, and capabilities of both parents.  In re Diehl
 The trial court’s determination of custody will not be disturbed upon review unless it is against the manifest weight of the discretion.  In re Diehl
 The trial court has broad discretion in making a custody determination; however, its discretion is not unlimited, and when the award is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the reviewing court to reverse that decision.  In re Bush
 In cases involving custody, a strong and compelling presumption exists in favor of the result reached by the trial court.  Hollo v. Hollow
 Only where the custody award is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence will it be reversed.  In re Yakin 
 Although the original custody judgment had resulted from an agreement of the parties and the trial court had not heard evidence concerning the child’s best interest, the reviewing court would not hear all the evidence do novo when one party subsequently petitioned for modification.  In re Gargus
 As the trial court is in a superior position to determine the best interests, that determination will not be disturbed on review unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence or represents an abuse of discretion.  Kjellesvik v. Shannon