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The legislative purpose behind the adoption of subsection (c) of this section is to allow the parties to a dissolution proceeding to remain liable for the support of children beyond emancipation.  Falat v. Falat
 Subsection (b) of this section does not represent an attempt by the legislature to control public morals.  In re Reeder
 The legislature intended to allow future maintenance to survive the remarriage of the receiving party if the judge approves.  In re Freeman
 The legislative purpose behind subsection (c) of this section is to permit the parties to agree to remain liable for the support of the child beyond emancipation.  In re Donahoe
 Prior to the enactment of subsection (c) of this section, support orders were of no legal effect after the death of the obligor and, for various reasons, children of a previous marriage often were not included in the obligor’s will; subsection (c) of this section was designed to correct this problem and eliminate the hardship imposed upon children through loss of support by disinheritance.  Halas v. Executor of Estate of Halas
 The purpose of a modification proceeding is to show that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the prior judgment.  Giamanco v. Giamanco
 The legislative purpose behind subsection (c) of this section is to permit the parties to agree to remain liable for the support of the child beyond emancipation.  Finley v. Finley
 Reading subsection (a) and (b) of this section together would disregard the clearly expressed intention of the legislature to establish a new and distinct standard for termination of maintenance.  In re McGowan
 It was the intention of the legislature to provide for the termination of an ex-spouse’s obligation to pay future maintenance whenever the spouse receiving the maintenance has entered into a husband-wife relationship with another, whether this be by legal or other means.  Halford v. Halford

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Where the respondent’s answer to plaintiff’s petition seeking modification of a divorce decree’s property settlement squarely put in issue the basic allegations of the petition, and contained averments which, if supported by the evidence, strongly suggested the absence of any fraudulent concealment, such pleadings raised issues of fact which had to be tried and the trial court’s order granting relief was relief was reversed and remanded.  Wilson v. Wilson
Construction
___Mandatory Provision
 Subsection (a) of this section is permissive and allows the trial court to exercise its discretion in modifying maintenance or support, while subsection (b) of this section is mandatory and flatly states that the obligation to pay maintenance is terminated by the resident, continuing conjugal cohabitation of the recipient with another person.  In re McGowans
___With Supreme Court Rules
 Rule 296, Supreme Court Rules, does not authorize the court to ignore 750 ILCS 5/505 or this section, but merely provides an additional tool for the court to use in fairly resolving child-support disputes.  In re Fink
Default/Vesting Date
 Each support or maintenance payment is vested on the date it becomes due, this date becoming the default/vesting date, which is important for: (1) calculating the total arrearage, (2) calculating the interest owed, if any (3) an indicator or factor in determining whether the conduct was willful or contumacious, and (4) calculating attorney fees under section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/508).  In re Hardy
___Burden of Proof
 Where no information other than that elicited by husband’s counsel was presented regarding the daughter’s financial resources and her financial dependency on her mother, and the little information received on cross-examination did not support the mother’s request that the father contributed to the daughter’s education and maintenance, wife failed to meet her burden of supporting request for educational support.  In re McGory

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 Where the petitioner agreed to a modified judgment after the respondent had remarried, implicit in the agreement was a waiver of the remarriage provision.  In re Adamson
 Remarriage of the parties does render the prior divorce decree unenforceable.  In re Parks
 The first Illinois case to discuss the effect of a remarriage upon a prior divorce decree is In re Marriage of Leon, where the court held that the trial court in a first divorce action is divested or further jurisdiction with regard to the division of property upon the subsequent remarriage and redivorce of the parties.  In re Parks
 The term “remarriage” as it appears in this section means the ceremony of marriage and not the status or marriage, and the declaration of the invalidity of petitioner’s remarriage did not act to reinstate the maintenance obligation.  In re Harris
 Marriage settlement agreements may extend maintenance payments beyond the recipient’s remarriage.  Broadway bank v. Kakos
 Remarriage of the recipient spouse does not automatically reduce an unallocated award of maintenance and child support; rather, as is required in other cases where a modification is sought, the party desiring the reduction must petition the court to modify its prior decree.  In re Erickson
 Where ex-husband ceased his alimony payments on the remarriage of his ex-wife but voluntarily resumed his alimony payments upon the judicial declaration of invalidity of his ex-wife’s remarriage, the actions of the parties evidenced an intent that the term remarriage, as used in the parties’ decree of divorce, referred to a status of marriage rather than a ceremony of marriage.  Thomas v. Thomas
 The trial court properly denied former husband retroactive recovery of a portion of the monthly payments made to former spouse during the period she resided with her present husband before her marriage, where the payments were characterized as child support.  In re Kessler
 The provisions of a consent decree that the husband pay each year for two plastic eyes required by the wife violated the public policy against payment of alimony and maintenance after remarriage and was therefore a nullity. Balasa v. Balasa

The court has the power to modify a decree or order as to child support and educational payments and there are no exceptions in regard to prior agreements or “consent decrees;” the trial court is not deprived of the power to modify a consent decree. Duvall v. Duvall

Effect of Amendment
 The 1981 amendment to subdivision (b), adding the language, “unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court”, was not intended to change the law but was instead intended to clarify the law.  In re Arvin
 A marital settlement agreement which predated the 1981 amendment to subsection (c) of this section did not include provision for termination of maintenance on basis of conjugal cohabitation, and therefore there could be no termination on this basis.  In re Arvin
 The 1982 amendment to subsection (b) of this section, is fully applicable to proceedings conducted prior to the effective dates of the amendments.  In re Davis
 The amendment to subsection (b) of this section, which became effective January 1, 1982, was the applicable law on the appeal of a pending case because of the general rule that when the legislature changes the law while an appeal is pending, the reviewing court will apply the law as it exists at the time of its decision, rather than the law as it was at the time of the trial court’s judgment.  Krug-Etheridge v. Krug

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 Where parties’ agreement clearly and unambiguously limited the duration of maintenance by stating that it would not extend beyond the earliest of three specific events, the expiration of 78 months, and the wife’s death or remarriage, and the agreement precluded a modification extending wife’s right to maintenance beyond that time, although the parties’ agreement was sufficiently clear to make the duration of payments non-modifiable, because the agreement incorporated into the judgment of dissolution did not clearly preclude modification of the amounts of maintenance and other amounts payable with the time limitations prescribed by the parties’ agreement.  Tucker v. Tucker
 Post-dissolution modification of maintenance is judicially precluded only where a settlement agreement clearly and unambiguously expresses the parties’ intent to make maintenance non-modifiable.  Tucker v. Tucker

 Where marital settlement agreement contained definition for when emancipation occurred, since the agreement did not specifically limit the provision to the husband only, wife was ordered to pay child support until youngest child in husband’s custody reached emancipation under terms of the agreement.  In re Sweders
 The respondent was not obligated for additional post majority expenses unless by virtue of the marital settlement agreement.  In re Leming
 The court could properly require the continuation of support payments for educational purposes after the child attained the age of majority.  Harding v. Harding

 Trial court abused its discretion in failing to comply with 750 ILCS 5/510(a) and 750 ILCS 5/513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/510(a) and 750 ILCS 5/513, before extending the termination date of a support order to provide child support for an 18 year-old until his graduation from high school.  Waller v. Waller
 The trail court did not abuse its discretion in increasing the amount of child support where the children had grown older and, thus, the court could presume their needs increased, ex-wife testified that as the children were older, they became more involved in school activities, thereby increasing their expenses, husband’s financial affidavits indicated he was making a higher salary than he did at the time of dissolution and this way not contradicted, and  ex-wife was not making much more money and testified she needed the child support in order to make ends meet.  In re Lambdin
 Petitioner clearly established both increased expenses for her daughters and respondent’s increased ability to support them; hence, the appellate court found an abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition for modification and found that the record supported an increase in child support in an amount calculated pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/505(a).  In re Heil
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Maintenance in gross in a non-modifiable sum certain to be received by the former spouse regardless of any change of circumstances; where indefinite period was fixed and monthly payments were not a sum certain, such an award could not be considered maintenance in gross.  In re Arvin
 Where the marital separation agreement executed by petitioner and respondent prescribed that the respondent pay a lump sum over a definite number of installments, the intent of the parties, as determined from the written marital separation agreement, was to create an award of maintenance in gross in a lump sum payable over a definite number of installments.  In re Hildrebrand
 Maintenance in gross awarded the petitioner under 750 ILCS 5/504(b) was not subject to termination upon remarriage pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.  In re Davis

 When setting an amount for modification of child support, the court may consider the same factors used when formulating an original support order; these factors include the standard of living the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been dissolved, and the financial resources of the noncustodial parent.  In re Boyden
 The factors to be considered for modification or termination as to each party are: (1) their ages, social conditions, health, and whether there are any children dependent upon them for support, (2) the duration of the marriage, since the longer the marriage the greater a woman’s claim for support becomes, and (3) their agreement as to the property settlement adopted in the divorce decree.  Gorman v. Gorman

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___In General
 Bankruptcy court determined that the Illinois state court ordered child support debt was nondischargeable; the court found that the debtor waited too long after his divorce and after he assumed the responsibility of support payments to challenge paternity of the child and get retroactive relief, pursuant to 750 ILCS 45/5(a)(1).  Alter v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Aid
 “Support” is simply a general term that can include educational expenses for a child who has turned 18 but is still in high school, and educational expenses may include room and board, just as the more generic term, support, may include shelter and food; a trial court can award support to disabled unemancipated children , minor or nonminor under 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(1), and a particular kind of support, educational expenses, to nonminor children in school under 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2).  In short, if the child has attained majority, the trial court must turn to § 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILC 5/513, when deciding whether to award support for that nonminor child.  Waller v. Waller
 Subsection (a) of this section allows for modification of child support orders only upon a showing of substantial change in circumstances, and the burden of proof is on the party who seeks the modification.  In re Fuesting
 Where no benefit accrued to the custodial parent by the noncustodial parent’s action of reducing the received child support, and it could not be concluded that the payor’s actions were the result of apparent or implied authority or that there was a principal and agent relationship between the parties, consequently, the legal concept of ratification was misapplied.  In re Jackson
 The section guarantees the dependent minor child of divorced parents from loss of support through disinheritance; while a divorced parent is free to disinherit a child of his divorced marriage, he may do so only subject to the limited obligation of support.  In re Dulyn
 The paramount concern in child support litigation is the support of the minor children.  Gentile v. Gentile
 In a modification proceeding, the fact that at least a part of a trial court’s reasoning consisted of the assumption that the parties knew what they were getting into was not a valid basis for affirming a divorce agreement which provided for no child support.  Cross v. Cross

___Accounting
 Since it was within the trial court’s discretion, due to fluctuations in husband’s income, to order respondent husband to submit a quarterly accounting of his net income to petitioner wife, the child support order was modified to require an annual accounting.  Smith v. Smith

___Arrearages
 Where the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant was directly in conflict with respect to the extent with which defendant had met his child support obligation to spend an additional $15 per month per child, the trial court had the responsibility of resolving this conflict and to determine the credibility of witnesses; the finding of the trial court under such conditions should be approved unless it is found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  Neeland v. Neeland
 Past-due installments of child support are a vested right, and the court has no authority to modify them, either as to amount or time of payment.  Gregory v. Gregory

___Burden of Proof
 A trial court may, on application, terminate or make such alterations in the allowance of child support, as shall appear reasonable and proper and the burden of proof is on the person seeking modification to show such material change in circumstances as would warrant modification.  In re McDavid

___Calculation
 Per diem payments made to the husband, an over-the-road truck driver, constituted income for the purpose of calculating child support but could be deducted from income to the extent the husband proved he used those payments for actual travel expenses, but the husband had the burden of proving his actual expenses and of establishing a lawful basis for deducting them.  Worrall v. Worrall
 Because the language “$30.00 child support” was susceptible of being understood as ordering respondent to make either a lump sum payment in the amount of $30 or periodic payments in $30 increments, and the record did not justify an interpretation of $30 per week child support, the award calculated on the basis of that interpretation was improper.  In re Szczotka
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