The trial court did not err in ruling that the assignment to the former husband’s attorney of funds owed the former husband from a corporation was void on the basis of fraud and was of no effect that the funds due to the former husband from said corporation were properly ordered delivered to appellee as partial payment of child support arrearages. Till v. Till.
Past due installments of alimony and support money are a vested right, and the court has no authority to modify them in any particular, either as to amount or time of payment. Shuff v. Fulte.
Neither estoppel nor laches barred a parent from petitioning the court for back child support from her husband, where the husband had agreed to forbear visitation in return for cancelling support arrearages. Blisset v. Blisset.
A minor child, by his grandmother as next friend, could not compel his father to pay him arrearages in child support. Kelleher v. Kelleher.
Insofar as the question of payment for a child taken from the jurisdiction without permission of the court was concerned, residence in another state was not to be considered as to past-due support payments. Voss v. Voss.
The court may not cancel or deny past due child support payments granted pursuant to a decree of divorce, because past due installments of support money are a vested right and are not subject to modification either as to amount or time of payment. Baldwin v. Baldwin.
With respect to a trial court’s calculation of a father’s child-support arrearage, the trial court (1) did not err either in finding that the father’s unreported bonuses were to be included in the father’s income for determining arrears of the father’s child support obligations, failing to deduct FICA and dependent health care insurance costs from the father’s bonuses in determining arrears, or deviating from the statutory guidelines in determining the father’s future child support obligations, but (2) did err in adding the father’s tax refunds back into his bonuses for purposes of determining the arrears. Therefore, the appellate court modified the amount of the father’s arrears. Ackerley v. Ackerley.
In accordance with the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, trial courts “shall” use the guidelines and standards set forth in determining whether to modify an order for child support in accordance with Anderson v. Heckman.
The standards contained in this section regarding child support are applicable to the determination of temporary child support. In re Rogliano.
The guidelines in this section for awarding minimum child support are to be applied unless the court, after considering evidence presented on certain relevant factors, finds a reason for deviating from them. In re Steichen.
Although each judgment of support order arrearages has the full force, effect, and attributes of any judgment of this state, including the ability to be enforced, this fact alone will not confer appellate jurisdiction; if such judgments for arrearage were deemed final for the purposes of appeal, then an appeal conceivably could be taken with every monthly installment, thereby creating piecemeal appeals. In re Ryan.
The order setting a mother’s child support at a certain percentage of her income was not final and appealable. Thus, related orders on the issues of custody and visitation were not final and appealable. Particularly where the child support order did not set a particular dollar amount. Shermach v. Brunory.
The former husband, who paid in excess of specific sums set forth in settlement agreement, who at the time of the agreement, had a retarded child, and who made payments equal to 50% of his income, did not have to pay 50% of his income to ex-wife for alimony and support years later. In re Whetstone.
Where the agreement states a percentage of income as support, the trial court should apply subdivision (a)(3) to determine the net income, and then state the child support as a dollar amount. In re Sheetz.
Where demands were placed upon defendant from other jurisdictions for other children and for debts other than the standard debts of his personal household, an order for child support in an amount less than the guidelines prescribed by the Act was not appropriate. People ex rel. Browning v. Melton.
As a matter of public policy, it would be imprudent to conclude that all orders for child support not set in dollar amounts are void. Child support is for the benefit of the child, and the parties cannot deprive the child of such support by agreement. In re Florence.
This statute was intended to protect the rights of children to be supported by their parents in an amount commensurate with their income. Agreements between the parties which ignore the statute’s mandate cannot be condoned. In re Perry.
If a child support agreement between the parties is not in the best interests of the children’s welfare, or if by reason of changed circumstances it becomes contrary to their best interests, the court is not bound by that agreement. Page v. Page.
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