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March 31, 2010
Where plaintiff used his equity in first residence to purchase a new home titled in both parties’ names, thereby commingling the properties so as to transmute his equity into marital property, the residence was properly classified as marital. In re Thacker
A family residence was properly deemed marital property where the husband purchased the house approximately two months before the parties were married by borrowing $3,000 for the down payment and mortgaging the remaining purchase price, as he never spent any money from personal funds accumulated prior to the marriage, and the mortgage payments were made with marital funds. In re Ohrt
Where house was purchased by the parties prior to, but “in contemplation of” their marriage; the parties were living together at the time of the purchase and had discussed acquiring a marital home; they both accompanied the real estate agent to view the property for the first time; they both signed the offer to purchase the property; former wife’s parents provided a loan of $5,000 towards the down payment; and additional $5,000 came from the parties joint funds; they used joint funds in addition to the rental income from the property to make the mortgage payments prior to moving into the home; and during the marriage all mortgage payments were made from marital funds, the house was considered a marital asset. In re Malters
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Where do you look for these financial documents? Some of the information may be at your fingertips, but some might require sleuthing. Start looking in the obvious places — where you and your spouse keep important papers in the house and in your safe-deposit box, if you have one. But also watch the mail, and be alert to anything from insurance companies, credit-card companies, banks, brokerage firms, and mutual-fund companies. Go to your employer for work-related documents, such as what you currently have in your pension account. Ask your accountant, attorney and financial advisors for copies of any financial information they have,
such as prior tax returns or documents on ownership of property.
March 19, 2010
Satisfy Your Credit Counseling Requirement Before Filing Bankruptcy
http://1beforefiling.com
March 18, 2010
January 12, 2008
Custodial parent who removed children from Illinois to Louisiana and obtained a Louisiana court order that prohibited visitation by the other parent the day prior to a scheduled visitation was properly found in contempt of the Illinois visitation order because the Louisiana order did not excuse the custodial parent’s noncompliance where it was intentionally procured as a way not to follow the order with which the custodial parent disagreed and because the Illinois court retained exclusive jurisdiction over the matter regardless of where the children were taken. In re Marriage of Kneitz.
November 6, 2007
STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) SS
COUNTY OF C O O K )
AFFIDAVIT OF LMD IN SUPPORT OF PETITION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
LMD, being duly sworn on oath, and having personal knowledge of the relevant facts presented herein, states as follows:
1. Affiant, LMD, the Defendant in the above-entitled action, makes this Affidavit in support of the Petition to vacate the judgment entered therein on November 8, 1991, in favor of Plaintiff and against Affiant in the amount of $741.06, and costs.
2. That said judgment should not have been entered and should not be allowed to stand because I nor my automobile was involved in the accident that is the basis of the underlying lawsuit.
3. That said judgment was entered aforesaid without any fault or negligence of Affiant.
4. That upon receipt of the summons and complaint I immediately telephoned the Plaintiff’s attorney and was informed by the Plaintiff’s attorney that if I sent a letter stating I nor my automobile was involved in the accident he would dismiss the case.
5. That further, my automobile was Beige and not blue.
6. That further, my license plate number for my automobile at the time of the accident was PM2631 and not PM.
7. That at all times herein material Affiant has exercised due care and diligence in that I contacted Plaintiff’s attorney and was assured that the mistake would be corrected thus the
lawsuit would be dismissed.
8. Promptly on learning of entry of said judgment, Affiant
immediately said Petition to vacate said judgment.
9. Affiant has on the merits, a valid defense to Plaintiff’s purported cause of action therein, in that my automobile was not involved in the accident that is the underlying justification and cause of this lawsuit herein.
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October 11, 2007
Application and Construction
In order to preserve a property’s non-marital status one must prove that the entire property was acquired exclusively by one of the methods listed in subsection (a), and that its character was not subsequently altered by action of the owner; the interpretation of the effect of subsection (b) upon subsection (a) of this section is consistent with the Act’s expressed preference for the classification of property as marital and the shifting of the burden of proof to the party seeking control of the property. In re Smith
Evidence
Where wife testified she told husband prior to the marriage that she wanted to continue paying the mortgage, insurance premiums and real estate taxes, she expressed an intention to maintain the residence as her separate property, and placed in trust the title to the residence with her daughters as beneficiaries, testimony rebutted the presumption of marital property raised. In re Holman
Federal Employer’s Liability Action
The cause of action set forth in count II of the husband’s Federal Employer’s Liability Action complaint was a separate property right and non-marital in nature where it arose following the entry of the judgment of dissolution; it could not properly have been considered part of the property settlement agreement. In re Waeckerle
Future Acquisition of Assets
The court must consider non-marital property, even where the non-marital property will be received in the future, when it determines the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse and the amount and sources of income of the parties, as well as the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income. In re Smith
Future Earning Capacity
Future earning capacity flowing from an education was not considered a marital asset and, thus, not divided by the court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. In re Goldstein
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August 30, 2007
Adopted children’s Iowa state subsidy was properly credited against a father’s Illinois support obligation where the subsidy was meant to supplement the children’s support, the amount of the subsidy was greater than the father’s obligation would have been under Illinois child support guidelines, and the parents’ incomes were approximately equal. Newberry v. Newberry.
Credit card payments did not meet the parameters of subsection (h), therefore, defendant’s net income should not be reduced by the amount of such payments. In re Benish.
Where all of respondent’s arguments pertaining to the award of maintenance and child support were based on a single assumption: that no evidence refuted his assertion, based on his income tax returns, that his net income was not any more than $25,000, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider the ample evidence introduced at trial showing respondent’s income was far higher than he alleged. In re Hilkovitch.
Where the amount of the maintenance and support awarded was approximately 20% of the husband’s receipts for one year, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In re Dwan.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is an exception to the otherwise rigid rule that child support payments become vested when and as they accrue. Ruster v. Ruster.
The right to past due installments of child support payments is a vested right which may not be reduced or eliminated by courts. The exception to this rule is when the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied and then the doctrine may be applied to all or part of the past installments in a n appropriate case. Lewis v. Lewis.
August 23, 2007
Given the income of the family, the family’s style of living could not be financed through any means other than the depletion of the family’s savings, and the husband could not help but have noticed the questioned expenditures from a close corporation of which husband was the sole stockholder; thus, the trial court’s finding that the expenditures were made for marital purposes was not an abuse of discretion. In re Getautas
The expense of a final payment due upon a note which had financed the purchase of a lot could not be included within those ordinary household expenses the parties agreed the husband should pay during the pendency of litigation. In re Rapacz
The circuit court did not err in refusing to consider certain money credits to which husband may have been entitled before entering the instant judgment, namely, reimbursement for one-half the taxes, mortgage payments, and maintenance costs he was required to pay since the divorce, as well as a sum of money the order directed wife to pay him, which was never done, because the foregoing items merely related to setoffs against the amount of her portion of the proceeds of the sale; such matters could be presented and considered after the property had been sold since they did not affect the right to partition the property. In re Mercer
August 17, 2007
Two significant changes were made to the deposition procedure by the amendments effective January 1, 1996. One change limits discovery depositions to three hours, except by stipulation of all parties or upon order of the court upon a showing of good cause. Supreme Court Rule 206(d). Unlike other areas in which there are multiple parties, divorce litigation is usually limited to tow parties, so there is less controversy about dividing up the three hours among counsel. The three-hour limit is usually too short for the discovery deposition of a party when the case raises issues of economics and custody and/or visitation. A motion should be brought before the deposition asking that the three-hour limit be extended for those depositions if the parties cannot agree.
The second significant change limits the nature of the objections to be made at a discovery deposition in an attempt to prevent abusive behavior by counsel such as coaching through objections. Rule 206(c)(3) provides: “Objections at depositions shall be concise, stating the exact legal nature of the objection.”
The Committee Comments to this amended rule set forth its purpose: “Subparagraph (c)(3) has been added to eliminate speaking objections.”
If counsel persists in violating this rule after being warned on the record, if counsel engages in other improper tactics, or if the witness is uncooperative, though should be given to suspending the deposition and seeking relief from the court. Similarly, if the lawyer conducting the deposition strays too far from any permitted area of questioning or otherwise engages in improper conduct, relief should be sought from the court. The method of seeking relief from the court is found in Rule 206(e), which provides, in relevant part:
At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in any manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party, the court may order that the examination cease forthwith or may limit the scope and manner of taking the examination…Upon the demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to present a motion for an order.
The concept of the attorney “certifying” a question no longer exists in the rules and has not for many years. No special action needs to be taken by the attorney during the deposition to later move the court to compel an answer to a question that was not answered during the deposition. However, a reasonable discussion between counsel during the deposition regarding the propriety of a question, held pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 201(k), often makes the lawyers consider the soundness of their respective positions and may lead to a compromise during the course of the deposition.
After the deposition is concluded, the deponent will be given an opportunity to review the transcript and make changes under Supreme Court Rule 207(a). However, the amendments effective January 1, 1996, severely limit the nature of the changes to be made by the deponent. Current, the deponent may make only changes based on reporting or transcription errors. Under prior practice, changes were permitted even when the court reporter accurately reported the testimony but the witness “misspoke” during the deposition.
The changes to Rule 207 have spurred discussion in legal circles. Among the articles discussing the effects of the rule change is Robert S. Minetz, The Quandary Facing Deponents who Err at Deposition, 88 Ill.B.J. 276 (2000). In the article, Mr. Minetz discusses the inconsistencies of the rule with other similar facets of trial practice (e.g., a trail witness is free to correct mistakes made while on the stand) and potential trial preparation and presentation problems associated with the rule as it currently stands.
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